I. INTRODUCTION
Economic and social rights include the rights to access food, water, housing, health care, education, and social security -what might approximate the basic goods and services necessary to secure a dignified existence. 1 The terms themselves are indeterminate. As legal rights, they chart a path to protection that may diverge into a renegotiation of the legal rules of property, or of the way in which the legal system responds to differences in gender, race, disability and nationality, or of the way in which law shapes the delivery of services, the planning of cities and the functioning of hospitals, schools, transport, and industry. The indeterminacy of economic and social rights is not simply one of language: it belongs to law's unpredictable relationship with experience.
Here lies the fundamental concern for the adjudication of economic and social rights.
In enforcing the duty to respect, protect or promote economic and social rights -indeed, in being a duty-holder themselves 2 -courts are called on to decide on the nature of such rights, their scope and the obligations that flow from them. Facing the complexity of the myriad institutions which impact upon the material terms of social life, they must discharge their role in enforcing the positive arrangements that determine who does what in order to secure economic and social rights.
Two prescriptions are currently offered to address this concern: the first counsels avoidance, the second, an embrace. On the one hand, courts should stay out of the contestations around economic and social rights, which are better employed as moral "talk" for politics, or at most, as unenforceable guides for legislative or administrative decision-making. 3 The institutional features of courts that make resource management supervising its protection with strict timelines and detailed plans. Finally, peremptory review is involved when the court registers its superiority in interpreting the right, and in commanding and controlling an immediate response.
Importantly, these types do not sit along a plane of "strength" and "weakness" of judicial review because the power that the court deploys -its ability to enforce, with approximate finality, a pre-determined norm -is multidimensional. The mode of review is coextensive with a number of different institutional responses, and is specified by the interpretation of the right at hand, the evaluation of the government's actions, and the design of a remedy.
Many aspects of one type of review are shared by those of another, and the five are not exhaustive. In Part III of this article, I suggest that all five -deferential, conversational, experimentalist, managerial and peremptory stances -are part of a general judicial role conception which I term catalytic. The catalytic function of the court offers a principled, and yet nevertheless highly contextual, resolution to the challenges of adjudicating constitutional economic and social rights, which is knitted into the judicial culture and the wider constitutional culture. 7 I suggest that by engaging in a catalytic function, the Constitutional Court opens up the relationship with the elected branches, and lowers the political energy that is required in order to achieve a rights-protective outcome.
The catalytic metaphor helps to demonstrate that the Constitutional Court of South Africa deploys the variety of stances of judicial review as a deliberate choice, and that certain criteria guide this choice. I suggest that the choice of the form of review turns on the government action that has led to an alleged infringement of a right, and only indirectly on the content of the right itself. For example, the Constitutional Court's explicit reluctance to define the normative "content" of economic and social rights -to articulate, for example, the juridical implications of a dignity-based interpretation of the right to housing or health care, or even to accept the very possibility of a judicial interpretation via a "minimum core" or otherwise "self-standing" right 8 -is matched by an implicit reluctance to be held to a specific form of review. However, I will show that where the lack of access to a good or service that would secure an economic and social right is additionally affected by equality concerns, the Constitutional Court's stance is more likely to be interventionist in character, suggesting a liberal-egalitarian impulse (rather than, for example, communitarian or libertarian alternatives) in interpreting economic and social rights.
Finally, I contrast the catalytic stance with three other judicial role conceptions: that of a detached, an engaged, and a supremacist court. This presentation of role conceptions is therefore a second typology of economic and social rights adjudication that overlays the first. My theorization of role conceptions moves beyond the initial presentation of specific judgments and remedies, by showing how a court's adjudication of economic and social rights will be linked to how the court perceives itself as an institution of governance and how this perception helps it to comprehend, and address, complaints. It also indicates that the typology, initially drawn from South Africa, can help us to understand the role of other countries' courts in the adjudication of economic and social rights.
II. A TYPOLOGY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The function of a typology is familiar to the comparativist. It can classify previously disjointed features, and present clusters of analysis which were previously kept apart.
Nonetheless, in advancing new clusters, and the insights that they deliver, typologies create blindspots and contradictions. The models of review that are discussed below have grown out of appraisals of the "success" of a long, and live, tradition of public law cases, combining recent South Africa, with the United States and elsewhere. 9 My typology of judicial review, and of judicial role conceptions, does not so much herald a "new" form Second, the Constitutional Court has ordered diverse remedies to address detected unconstitutionality, attempting to bring about change at different levels in different sectors, by declaring particular infringements and incompatibilities, by ordering engagement between the parties, by issuing timelines and other terms of delivery, by suspending its orders, or by reading-in "curing words" to legislation.
The measures of such variety lie in the judicial approaches to interpretation, the degree of scrutiny of the government's action, and the remedy ordered. Such measures are helped by Tushnet's depictions of "strong" and "weak" courts and the forms of judicial review that accompany them. 21 Within this classification, "strong" courts tend towards rule-like interpretations of rights, heightened degrees of scrutiny, and muscular remedies. The assertive -and perhaps supremacist -practice of the U.S. Supreme Court is the case in point. 22 Weak courts, on the other hand, issue contextualized standards for interpreting rights, relaxed scrutiny, and, if liability is still found, relatively tentative and/or declaratory forms of relief. Importantly, the distinction of strong/weak is not represented as a dichotomy, but a continuum. 23 Strong rights can coexist with weak remedies, and vice versa. A quadrant of judicial stances is established, with a range of possible approaches that categorize different courts in different jurisdictions, or at least the different judgments in the different courts of different jurisdictions.
Tushnet's descriptive model is also potentially prescriptive. "Strong" articulations of rights and remedies in the area of economic and social rights may bring courts into disrepute, and instigate popular backlash in civil society against the very interests that rights purport to protect. Weak courts, on the other hand, may combine muted expressions of rights and a more relaxed insistence on remedies, to protect themselves and the beneficiaries of constitutional rights. While weak courts may therefore fail to protect the interests at hand, the dialogue that they engender can assist those in a similar position, by effecting change in laws and policies over the longer term. 23 Id., 36 (suggesting the possibility of "blended" systems, with "strong-form review with respect to some constitutional issues, weak-form review with respect to others").
weak court has a tendency to become strong, after the precedents of prior cases have accumulated and the court has become invested in the results of its decisions. The rightsprotective advantages of weak courts may therefore be short-lived.
I argue that the weak/strong classification, while useful to comparative constitutional law, is suspended from the subtleties that contextualized study can provide. Attention to the degrees of "strength" and "weakness" of courts may obscure the variety of interactions between the courts and other institutions in resolving the challenges behind justiciable economic and social rights. "Weak" review may bear some parallels with the style of judicial deference, or of dialogue, explicitly adopted by many courts, 24 but fails to cast light on the matrix of inter-branch and extra-branch relations that are required to secure economic and social rights. "Strong" review bears similarities to a more heavyhanded approach to judicial review by supremacist apex courts, but may just as easily describe the very different managerial, hands-on, approach by lower courts. 25 Departing mid-way between these approaches, which is neither "weak" nor "strong" (neither in
Tushnet's terms, and nor in more conventional understandings of judicial power) is the judicial promotion of party-driven experiments within the scaffolding of certain deliberative requirements.
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Indeed, the overall variety of the types of review I survey eschews classification in terms of judicial power or normative finality. The following five positions of deferential, conversational, experimentalist, managerial and peremptory review open the scene of action beyond that of the courts and the elected branches, to situate the court within a web of relations involving litigants, beneficiaries of rights who are similarly situated to the litigants, other parties who will be harmed or helped by the judicial action, and the wider public. I demarcate these types of review, and describe the relations between them:
one type of review has often arisen in response to the perceived disadvantages of another.
Often, these advantages and disadvantages are perceived as such, by assessing their ability to address the broad aims of protecting fundamental material interests, in line with 24 See infra, Pt IIA-B. 25 See infra, Pt IID-E. 26 See infra, Pt IIC.
dignity, that are encapsulated by economic and social rights. By connecting them in this way, this typology is irreducibly normative.
A. Deferential Review
Deferential review is a model of review which belongs to the tradition of defending judicial review in democratic terms. In exercising deferential review, courts give credence to the democratic authority and epistemic superiority of, and textual conferral of tasks to, the legislative and executive branches. 27 While democratic authority is the best rationale for deference to the legislature, as the most electorally-accountable and representative branch, epistemic authority is more fitting for the executive, as the branch equipped with the most technical resources and information. Epistemic authority is also a good rationale for deference to legislatures, particularly in countries where the legislative branch maintains its own expert and technical staffs and resources, independent of the executive.
In deferring to the legal and epistemic authority of the elected branches, a court is able to address the double-pronged legitimacy and competency critiques applied to the adjudication of economic and social rights. By giving attention to the comparative competence of other institutions, deference suggests that the deferred-to decision-maker possesses important information, experience and accountability that help it decide relevant questions correctly, or at least in an abler fashion than the court could do.
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Deference, particularly epistemic deference on expertise grounds, therefore involves both a positive statement about the abilities of the executive or legislature as a decision-maker, and a negative statement about the weakness of the court as a decision-maker relative to these branches. 29 Although not usually given as a justification for deference, this further "legislative sequels" to the judicial action. 55 The Constitutional Court's focus is not on resolving the immediate homelessness of the claimants, but on the effective change of housing policy over the longer term. Such interaction has paid off, according to some commentators. For example, four years after the decision, the Department of Housing adopted a new programme, which focused on assisting people in urban and rural areas with urgent housing needs, as a result of natural disasters, evictions, demolitions, or imminent displacements. 56 In the interim, the decision helped in subsequent adjudication to alleviate red-tape impediments to government's acting to address the emergency housing needs of other vulnerable communities, which nearby property-owners had raised.
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When the Constitutional Court was required, two years after Grootboom, to adjudicate on the right to health care, it similarly deployed a conversational stance. 58 The
Treatment Action Campaign case was a challenge to the government's decision to restrict the roll-out of antiretroviral drugs which would prevent the transmission of HIV from mother to child during childbirth. This time, while purporting to adopt a deferential stance, the Constitutional Court found the government's policy was unreasonable. It famously ordered the government to desist from preventing the roll-out of drugs and to meet other treatment and counseling expenses. The Court refused to endorse the structural interdict and injunction remedies that had been made by the High Court at first instance, on the basis that "the government has always respected and executed orders of this Court". 59 Instead, the Constitutional Court made a mandatory order requiring the government to permit and to facilitate (in a minor respect), the public health sector use of the antiretroviral.
The Constitutional Court's decision in the Treatment Action Campaign case brought an end to a highly criticized aspect of the South African government's policy on HIV/AIDS, and set in motion many other changes to the government's general stance towards the disease. Yet the remedies were not immediately effective. In some provincial governments, compliance was not forthcoming. A further application to the High Court for a contempt order was required, in one province, which was not resolved until six months after the successful case. 60 With even minor delays, many lives were lost.
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The success of the remedies -in most of the provinces -was in large part due to the activities of the social movement that brought the case, rather than merely the interbranch conversation that was created by the Constitutional Court. 62 William Forbath has described the way in which the Treatment Action Campaign litigant worked to bring about the cultural transformation and institutional reforms required to secure the right to health care in this context; a strategy which was also indispensable to the success of the court order, and interdependent with the judicial stance adopted by the Constitutional 
C. Experimentalist Review
A third type of review is experimentalist in character. Experimentalist review describes a dynamic, systematic practice of adjudication. This posture puts further pressure on the conversational theme by directing the parties -including, but not only limited to government -to negotiate and devise their own solutions to the "problem"
which has diminished the enjoyment of economic and social rights. This style of review is intended to confront the systemic, or structural, features of the lack of enjoyment of economic and social rights. In experimentalist review, a court is not deferential; rather, it is ready to engage in a vigorous assessment of the reasonableness of policy or legislation, which involves a contextualized investigation against the commitments of the Constitution. A court is further prepared to order remedies that may take on a limited structural form. This political project is achieved, not by prescribing the immediate steps toward a solution, but by "nudging", "linking" and "destabilizing" public institutions.
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The capacity of such experiments to induce structural reform through litigation has gained prominence by writers in the tradition of "new governance", and "democratic experimentalism". similarities to the experimentalist tendencies observed in the U.S. and Europe as compatible with the experimentalist theme.
First, there is general reluctance on the part of the court in economic and social rights cases to prescribe a solution; but unlike deferential or conversational review, the Constitutional Court has sometimes delegated this task as a problem solving activity to the parties themselves. Second, the Constitutional Court has affirmed that the judicial process should be used as last, not first, resort, and continues to question the finality of its normative position-taking. At the same time, it has issued explicit encouragement to parties to seek it out.
Third, while conversational review may allow for a more patient remedial result, as a court is content to signal its message to the legislature and wait for a response, experimentalist review is more provocative, insisting on a different prioritization of interests, and the input of a new set of actors, within the legislative scheme. Using various degrees of remedial intervention, it is more dynamic than the formal expectation that electoral politics will take its proper course. Moreover, experimentalist review goes further to force the active reconsideration of interests by the legislature. It is "linkage- to provide alternative accommodation. In canvassing the circumstances that would be relevant to a "just and equitable" eviction, the Constitutional Court emphasized the need to consider the vulnerability of occupiers (the elderly, children, disabled persons and households headed by women 73 ), the extent to which negotiations had taken place with the "equality of voice for all concerned", the reasonableness of offers made in connection to alternatives, the "time scales proposed relative to the degree of disruption involved", and the willingness of occupiers to respond.
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The Constitutional Court's interest in negotiation, as a method for informing the standard of reasonableness, and for ensuring delivery of the result, continued and evolved in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg. 75 In that case, the Court ordered that an eviction on housing safety and health grounds required first a "meaningful engagement" between public landholders and occupiers. It therefore suggested that the 400 occupiers of two buildings in inner city Johannesburg be allowed to engage first with the city, in order to establish whether the city could help in alleviating the consequences of eviction, and whether the unsafe buildings could be improved for an interim period. The Constitutional Court's order required that negotiations include the question of when and how the city could fulfill the obligations to meet the housing rights of the occupiers.
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These cases have been described as portending "a hybrid dispute resolution mechanism that incorporates the flexibility of ADR [alternative dispute resolution]
processes with the public norm creating capacity of traditional adjudication". 77 On this understanding, the Constitutional Court is attempting to generate values beyond the scope of the dispute, and yet spur the appropriate resolution in the particular case. 78 Yet it is precisely this hybridity that undergirds a tension in the experimentalist position. First, the court's attempts to correct the power imbalances of the weaker party are fraught with complications. 79 The very "immunity" rights that are relied on, in order to make participation meaningful and destabilization effective, are the economic and social rights that are the subject of contestations. 80 It is not only access to the democratic process, but to a degree of social security underlying that access, that marks out the sensitivity of the court to democratic failures. Finally, engagement is difficult when there is a real hostility between the parties. 81 For a stronger remedial position, we turn to managerial review.
D. Managerial Review
Managerial review suggests a heightened review of government action and a structured and/or mandatory form of relief, which requires a continuing, ground-level, day-to-day, control. In the first place, alleged infringements of economic and social rights are closely scrutinized by the court, which may go so far to prescribe their substantive "relief that is required to protect and enforce the Constitution. Depending on the circumstances of each particular case the relief may be a declaration of rights, an interdict, a mandamus or such other relief as may be required to ensure that the rights enshrined in the Constitution are protected and enforced. If it is necessary to do so, the courts may even have to fashion new remedies to secure the protection and enforcement of these all-important rights." See also S. Afr. Const., s.172(1)(b), providing that the Constitutional Court may make any order which is just and equitable. , that a freedom-of-choice plan in schooling would not be sufficient to discharge the affirmative duty on school boards to take "whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch"). 88 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (affirming the district court's modified decree ordering compensatory education programs for victims of segregation). 89 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (authorizing district court to use quotas, redraw attendance zones, and endorse optional majority-to-minority school transfers, and the busing of students, in order to achieve desegregation). 90 The suggestion that the Court obstructed, rather than assisted, the enactment of the Civil Rights Act, has been made: MICHAEL J. KLARMAN Such small decisions build up over time to promote unintended changes in institutions beyond the court's reach. 116 Such changes may not only be counterproductive to the objectives of the court order, but also result in backlashes for which the court will be held responsible.
These problems may be amplified in the economic and social rights context. For example, once the executive acts to implement a court order, and institutes a program involving the allocation or reallocation of goods or services protective of economic and social rights, it may be practically difficult for the executive to later withdraw or redesign such programs. 117 Moreover, a managerial approach to economic and social rights fuels the epithet of "queue-jumping" for successful litigants. Beyond the well-documented concern of a litigation explosion, and of setting public policy by judicial decree, lie effects on the wider pace and direction of transformation. In this way, managerialism can be seen as a precursor, rather than a response, to experimentalism.
E. Peremptory Review
A final stance offered by the Constitutional Court when adjudicating economic and social rights is here described as peremptory. This type of review is closer to the conventional static model of judicial review that invites either the striking down of legislation or the upholding of it. Peremptory review involves the rigorous scrutiny of government legislation or policy. Once an infringement is found, the remedy may be for the Court to overturn the legislation or policy. Peremptory review also encompasses other remedies in order to enforce the positive obligations that flow from economic and social rights. Instead of overturning the legislation, the court may choose to uphold it with an amendment; instead of severing the impugned provision, it may read in words to "cure" it. 115 Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note x, fn 142.
Peremptory review occurred in Khosa v. Minister of Social Development, when the
Constitutional Court held that the exclusion of permanent residents from social benefits was contrary to the right of everyone to social security, and to equality. 118 The majority elected to take a "hard look" at the legislature's reasons for restricting benefits to South African citizens. 119 In doing so, the Court refused to exercise mere rationality review, noting that the search for reasonableness demanded more of the government than the search for rationality and non-arbitrariness; the latter standard, the Court conceded, would have been met by the legislation. 120 Instead, the Court's test for "reasonableness"
is substantively based -and grounded in the Constitution's guarantees. These relate to the values of dignity, equality and freedom -and to the prohibition on unfair discrimination in section 9.
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The majority carefully assessed the financial reasons for excluding non-citizens; and the immigration policy's preference for creating self-sufficiency in permanent residents.
It held that these were, though rational, insufficient justifications. 122 In South Africa, "[s]haring responsibility for the problems and consequences of poverty equally as a community represents the extent to which wealthier members of the community view the minimal well-being of the poor as connected with their personal well-being and the wellbeing of the community as a whole". 123 While the Court found acceptable a differentiation between permanent and temporary or illegal residents, the differentiation between permanent residents and citizens did not pass muster. 124 "Like citizens", the Court held, permanent residents "have made South Africa their home." 125 In this respect, the Court was willing to find morally irrelevant a difference that is ideologically laden in South Africa (as it is elsewhere).
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The remedy was to read in "curing words" in the legislation, thus making "citizens and permanent residents" eligible for grants. 127 This remedy had the virtue of ensuring that claimants would receive benefits immediately; and that the legislation would not be delayed for other people, in the position of the claimants, who would also be eligible for social benefits. Rather than order a negotiation between the parties to settle the issue, as approaches have been adopted by a Constitutional Court which has demonstrated considerable unanimity since hearing its first economic and social rights complaint in 1998. These distinctive features do not turn, for now at least, on an ascending or descending majority.
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Of course, the different forms of judicial review contain features that blend into one another. In the famous Treatment Action Campaign case, for example, the Court adopted a conversational posture to the problem of obstruction of HIV/AIDS drugs in the delivery of health care, but asserted a certain degree of managerialism in requiring the testing and counseling of expectant mothers with HIV/AIDS. The way in which individual provinces were encouraged to adopt their own arrangements has also been described in experimentalist terms. 137 Similarly, Joe Slovo can be read as deferential to government policy, and yet retains experimentalist and even managerial features. Despite this blending, I suggest that the archetypes of each approach help to demonstrate that different forms of review are being employed to perform distinct ends; and yet hint at an overarching function for the Constitutional Court.
These five distinctive forms are replicated -to greater or lesser degrees -in comparative constitutional law. The typology thus reveals the migration of distinctive approaches to inter-branch and extra-branch interactions, as well as of constitutional doctrines and remedies. 138 As depicted by the typology, the forms of review are akin to those that have been developed, employed, and described, in other constitutional contexts, such as the U.S., Canada, and Europe. Significantly, these arise from cases, controversies and challenges outside of the economic and social rights context, and within the general realm of public law. suggest that the Court acts to lower the political energy that is required in order to change the way in which the government responds to the protection of economic and social rights. In doing so, the Court itself remains largely unchanged (or is at least not the main focus of the change). premises beyond the possibility of experimental rejection". 144 The Constitutional Court is now responsible for catalyzing change in keeping with the Constitution's broad aspirations, entrenched rights, and overall commitment to transformation.
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As is well-known, the Constitution was entrenched in order to check government and judicial power at the same time as issuing a summons to all three branches to address the legacy of almost half a century of apartheid and its destructive imprint on the terms of social life. 146 The direction of change was itself made the subject of constitutional precommitment: transformation was to be democratic, rights-protective, social-egalitarian, and focused on the burdens caused by the period of officially sanctioned racial discrimination in employment, land-holding, schooling and other critical determinants of prosperity and poverty. 147 In the representative terms of the interim preamble, the Constitution (and its Court) must span "a bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, belief or sex". 148 I suggest that a catalytic role conception is a response to this exhortation, perceived both by the Constitutional Court, and wider constitutional culture, of South Africa.
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B. Justificatory and Explanatory Accounts of the Catalytic Function
While more substantively informed elements of transformation have been identified in South Africa, 150 the one unifying theme of transformation is that it problematizes the status quo. Nonetheless, we require more than a thesis of transformation in order to detect (or prescribe) which form of review the Court will adopt in each case. In venturing this task, four prominent explanations are available. I explore each of them, before suggesting a fifth, which focuses on the government's actions that underlie the complaint of an economic and social rights infringement.
The first is that the Court's choice of review depends on whether the complaint rests with a positive or a negative obligation flowing from the economic and social right at hand. This explanation relies on the truism that enforcement of a negative obligation -an infringement of a duty to respect rights, because of active, and illegitimate, state interference -is less likely to threaten the traditional role of the court, since it will require one-dimensional assessments of infringements, and curtailed remedial intervention.
Sandra Liebenberg has suggested, for example, that the "reasonableness" inquiry is not applicable to the alleged infringement of negative obligations, because the situationally sensitive standard behind the duty of "progressive realization" is not required: the infringement will only be justified by the more stringent requirements of the general limitations clause. 151 Moreover, such an infringement, if found, can be remedied by a conventional order to desist from acting the way the government is presently acting.
Since the court will not need to catalyze positive action from the state, it can rest within conventional modes of review and remedy, which lie in the peremptory or deferential
domains. Yet, as the Treatment Action Campaign case makes clear, even negative infringements by the government are addressed by the Court using features of conversational and managerial review. 152 A clear lesson, from the legal realists onwards,
is that the background vulnerabilities that make active government interference burdensome on rights are also the result of state action. We might say, for example, that an active eviction, which interferes with a negative obligation to respect an individual's right to housing, will not be an infringement if alternative accommodation is available. 153 This reveals the continued instability of the negative/positive distinction, of duties no less than rights. 154 While we can still give some credence to the action/omission distinction, we must do so while conceding that it can obscure the prior effect of law's creations -of privileges and immunities, as well as of rights and duties -on present arrangements. 155 On this basis, the explanation of the choice of review as responsive to whether a positive or negative infringement is alleged, can only be partly correct.
The second explanation that moves beyond a simple thesis of transformation, is that Third, is the explanation that the Court's choice of review differs on the basis of the judicial manageability of the economic and social right that is claimed. This explanation would find empirical support in U.S. experience. 159 The right to health care, for example, is notoriously complex -its meaning depends upon the availability and constraints of scientific and cultural knowledge, and its satisfaction is partly contingent on genetics or luck. 160 The right to water, on the other hand, is apparently a readily measurable commodity that can link individual entitlements -by the liter -to consumption and sanitation needs. The one would appear to be more judicially manageable than the other:
so much was expected, at least, by the lower court in the Mazibuko case. In concluding that a free basic water policy of 25 liters per person per day was insufficient to meet their basic needs, to live in dignity and to avoid threats to their lives and health, the High Court judge had determined that managerial review -including an approved minimum core (resting at 50 liters per day), and a detailed plan of response -would be most appropriate.
The right to access water appeared measurable and determinate, which the Supreme Court of Appeal affirmed. 161 On further appeal, the Constitutional Court disagreed, refusing to engage in any statement of a quantified standard and deferring to the government's determination. 162 Managerial review was not considered appropriate, even for an apparently "manageable" right.
Fourth, is the explanation that the Court can choose to engage in more vigorous review when the cost implications of its order are negligible: its peremptory stance in Khosa was helped, for example, by the fact that the inclusion of indigent permanent residents in the social security regime would reflect "an increase of less than 2 % on the present cost of social grants". 163 Similarly, the Court's experimentalist order in Treatment Action Campaign was assisted by the fact that the antiretrovirals were free: their donation by pharmaceutical companies was guaranteed for a period of five years. Nonetheless, while this explanation tracks the cost-related objections to economic and social rights enforcement (which point to their tendency, to a greater extent than other rights, to require a reallocation of scarce resources on the part of the state), it is insufficient to account for the Court's changing modes of review. In Khosa, the additional cost for the government to bear (ranging -in a speculative fashion -between R243 and R572 million) was demonstrably not negligible. Increased appropriations were clearly required by such orders, at least in the short term. Moreover, understanding the Court's choice of review through the lens of cost is problematic. The Court has acknowledged that the cost of economic and social rights is a legitimate government concern, but has suggested that a raise in expenditure "may be a cost we have to pay for the constitutional commitment to developing a caring society". 164 More fundamentally, the Court does not engage in the task of assessing how its orders will increase or decree expenses over the long term: an extremely difficult conceptual and practical task, which commentators acknowledge. 165 I suggest that, in partial contrast to these four explanations, the choice of review adopted by the Court is more subtly responsive to the government's actions. Thus, I
suggest that the choice of review responds to the government action: whether, for example, the government is deliberately obstructive and even hostile to economic and social rights, whether it is inadvertently overriding such rights, or whether it is genuinely unable to deliver them. To demonstrate this effect, I find it useful to invoke Kent Roach's and Geoff Budlender's characterization of government's actions towards economic and social rights: which may be considered unreasonable because of intransigence, incompetence or inattentiveness. 166 An intransigent legislature or bureaucracy is one beset by inertia: immovable, through procedural practice or force of habit, to change
policy. An incompetent government is technically unable to access or process the information, or is practically constrained by a lack of funds. 167 An inattentive government, on the other hand, fails to comprehend the claims of the most materially vulnerable. This inattentiveness may be the product of the invisibility and exclusion of certain groups in public processes, due to the very fact of their material vulnerability, or because they are otherwise a politically vulnerable or unpopular minority. . It is noteworthy that the Court, in dismissing the challenge to the sufficiency of a free basic water supply, proceeded to confirm the importance of the litigation for water policy specifically, and for government policy in general: [159] - [169] . O'Regan J, writing for a unanimous Court, suggested that litigation around economic and social rights "fosters a form of participative democracy that holds government accountable and requires it to account between elections over specific aspects of government policy": [160] . 179 Yet we can also recognize the situationally specific aspects of these features; which itself is an important breakthrough, and one of the best justifications for constitutional comparison that one can provide. 176 See, eg, S. Afr. Const., s 38. For analysis of these latter two features for U.S. constitutionalism, see Bennett, supra note x. 177 For example, the New Zealand Supreme Court cannot engage in the peremptory review described here, because the Bill of Rights (NZ), s 4, does not allow the striking down of legislation. To accommodate this concern, the typology may be viewed, for comparative purposes, as attached to a local default norm: this explains why "deferential" may equate to a different stance in South Africa and the United States.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have suggested that the adjudication of economic and social rights by the South African Constitutional Court has taken place alongside a variety of styles of review. By this very variety, the South African jurisprudence on economic and social rights both extends and challenges the current prescriptions for courts in addressing economic and social rights. While the overall posture of the Constitutional Court forms an affinity with a catalytic court, it engages in a range of individual and discrete forms of judicial review that are poised to facilitate the government's (and the wider polity's) efforts in realizing economic and social rights. This finding disaggregates the comparative account provided by a modeling of weak or strong courts, and the modeling of experimentalist, or "new governance" courts.
First, I have grouped these forms of review along a spectrum of five techniques:
deferential, conversational, experimentalist, managerial and peremptory review.
Sometimes by demanding engagement, sometimes by justifying dialogue, sometimes by issuing decrees, but never by wholly taking over management, the Court "catalyzes" a transformation, which is calibrated to the background political and institutional context, 
